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Abstract 
This study examined whether young children are influenced by the subjective experience 
associated with an easy or difficult recall when making memory decisions. Seventy-one 
children, aged 4, 6, and 8 years, were asked to generate either a small (easy condition) or large 
(hard condition) number of first names. Statistical analyses revealed that participants in the 
hard condition were more likely to infer that they did not know many names than participants 
in the easy condition, contrary to what would be expected if children based their memory 
judgement on the objective number of recalled items. Overall, our results support the 
hypothesis that children as young as 4 years old rely on the subjective experience of ease to 
regulate their decision-making processes. Theoretical implications of these findings are 
discussed. 
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One of the most compelling issues currently examined by researchers studying the 
development of child metacognition relates to determining what kind of information children 
use in assessing their memory (Geurten, Willems, & Meulemans, 2015b; Hembacher & Ghetti, 
2014). Many studies of adults have shown that people may rely on the accessibility of 
information to evaluate their memory, a processing strategy that is known as the availability 
heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). In their classic experiment, Tversky and Kahneman 
(1973) demonstrated that people assess the relative frequency of two classes of stimuli on the 
basis of the ease with which relevant instances of each class come to mind (e.g., people judge 
words starting with a K to be more frequent than words where K is in the third position because 
the former are easier to generate). Over time, studies have revealed that people may rely on 
different aspects of the accessibility of information when making decisions: namely (1) what 
comes to mind and (2) how easily it comes to mind (Schwarz, 1998). On the one hand, some 
research shows that judgements about ambiguous information are dominated by the content 
that is the most accessible at the time of the evaluation (e.g., Pachur, Hertwig, & Steinmann, 
2012). Other studies suggest that we also form judgements on the basis of the ease with which 
this content can be brought to mind (Schwarz, 1998). According to the latter studies, we have 
the metacognitive belief that experienced ease of retrieval is a diagnostic cue of the ‘true’ 
frequency of different categories of stimuli.  
Interestingly, Winkielman, Schwarz, and Belli (1998) established that the subjective 
experience of ease of retrieval can also guide memory decisions. Specifically, they showed that 
people who were required to recall four childhood events (easy task) were more likely to infer 
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that they could remember large parts of their childhood than people who were asked to recall 
twelve such events (difficult task), although the former recalled only a third as many episodes.  
Nowadays, the involvement of the experienced ease of retrieval has been demonstrated 
in many domains of judgement. For instance, people rely on the ease with which examples of 
self-confident behaviours are recalled to determine whether they have an assertive personality 
(Schwarz et al., 1991). However, despite the well-established influence of experienced ease on 
a wide range of judgements, very few investigations have been conducted to examine whether 
children also rely on the subjective feeling of ease to guide their decisions. To our knowledge, 
the only research that has been conducted from a developmental perspective is the study by 
Davies and White (1994), which indicated that frequency judgements are already based on the 
ease with which names are processed by the age of 7 years. Thus far, the question of whether 
the same is true for younger children or for memory decisions has remained unexplored. From 
a theoretical point of view, the finding that young children’s memory judgements are 
influenced by the experienced ease of retrieval rather than only by the objective content of 
their memory would provide crucial information about the nature of the processes that are 
involved in decision making in early childhood. More specifically, it would corroborate the 
recent findings indicating that metacognitive expectations may already influence judgements in 
children as young as 4 (Geurten et al., 2015b). 
For these reasons, the present study was designed to examine whether young children 
under the age of 7 years old are influenced by the subjective feeling of ease when making their 
memory judgements. To this end, a paradigm inspired by the one described in Winkielman et 
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al.’s (1998) study was employed. However, because young children’s poor episodic memory 
prevents them from recalling many childhood events (Ratner, Smith, & Dion, 1986), an adapted 
procedure was used in our experiment. Specifically, children aged 4 (i.e., the youngest age at 
which reliance on metacognitive heuristics has been demonstrated; Geurten et al., 2015b), 6 
(i.e., an intermediate age between two important stages), and 8 years old (i.e., the age at which 
children seem to start exerting some control over metacognitive heuristics; Geurten et al., 
2015b) were required to retrieve either a small (easy condition) or a large (hard condition) 
number of first names, and then were asked to rate their memory for names. If participants 
based assessments of their memory on the ease with which they could generate the requested 
items (i.e., experienced ease), we predicted that they should judge their memory as worse after 
reporting many names than after reporting a few names. However, if subjective ease was 
considered non-diagnostic or was not experienced, or if a more systematic processing strategy 
was adopted, children might base assessments of their memory on the actual number of 
generated items (i.e., accessible content). In that case, they should judge their memory as 
better after reporting many names. Finally, if children did not base assessments of their 
memory on either of these cues, no difference should be found between the experimental 
conditions. Moreover, some authors have argued that the mature implementation of a 
heuristic requires inferential processes (Westerman, Miller, & Lloyd, 2003) that may be subject 
to effortful regulation (Miller & Lloyd, 2011). Therefore, once children attain a sufficient level of 
cognitive maturity, they may begin to effortfully control their decisions, thus becoming less 
likely to rely on subjective cues in irrelevant contexts. In the present study, 8-year-old children 
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Participants were 71 typically developing children aged 4, 6, and 8 years old. The 
proportion of girls and boys was roughly equivalent in each group, χ²(2) = 4.44, p = .11. An 
additional participant was tested but not included in our analyses because he refused to 
generate any other name than his own. No group difference was found in terms of parental 
education level and nonverbal intelligence, Fs < 1.94, respectively assessed using both parents’ 
years of education and scores on the Matrix test (Wechsler, 2005; Table 1). 
< Table 1 > 
Materials and Procedure 
Children were tested individually in a quiet room in their school after performing a 
battery of recognition memory tests (the results of these tests are presented elsewhere; 
Geurten, Meulemans, & Willems, in press). Each child was randomly assigned to one of the two 
experimental conditions (Easy vs. Hard). 
In the ‘Hard’ condition, participants were required to generate a large number of names 
(males’ names for boys; females’ names for girls). Pretests indicated that 4-year-old children 
found it challenging to generate more than six names, 6-year-old children found it challenging 
to give more than eight names, and 8-year-olds found it very difficult to produce more than ten 
names. In this context, the number of names that was requested in the hard condition was age-
adjusted: eight names were required from 4-year-old children, ten from 6-year-old children, 
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and twelve from 8-year-old children. Next, all participants were asked to judge how many 
names they knew (i.e., ‘Do you think you know a lot of boys’/girls’ names?’). Response options 
were ‘yes’, ‘no’, and ‘unsure’. 
In the ‘Easy’ condition, children in each age group were first asked to give four names 
before judging how many names they knew on the 3-point scale. Following their memory 
judgements, participants in the easy condition were also required to report an additional set of 
names (i.e., 4, 6, and 8 names, for the 4-, 6-, and 8-year-old age groups, respectively). This 
procedure was used to ensure that differences in participants’ judgements were not due to 
objective differences in the amount of information that they could retrieve from memory. 
After answering the memory question, children in both experimental conditions also 
rated how difficult it was to generate the requested number of names on a 3-point scale 




Pearson chi-square analyses were conducted to examine whether young children judged 
their memory as worse after retrieving a large (hard condition) than after retrieving a small 
(easy condition) number of names. Moreover, to ensure that our results were based on the 
responses of children who did not experience any failures in generating the requested number 
of names, we excluded from our analyses the children (n = 9) who were not able to report the 
number of names that was demanded for their age group (for a similar procedure, see 
Winkielman et al., 1998). However, the results of all the analyses presented in the following 
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section are similar when all 71 participants are left in the sample. Preliminary analyses revealed 
no gender effect on any of the dependent variables, all ps > .15. 
Manipulation Checks 
Our manipulation of the task difficulty was successful. Results of a two-way 3 (Age 
Group) x 2 (Condition) analysis of variance revealed a main effect of experimental condition. 
Specifically, participants in the hard condition rated the name generation task as more difficult 
(M = 2.42) than participants in the easy condition (M = 1.61), F(1,56) = 16.85, p < .001, η²p = .23. 
No other effect reached significance, Fs < 1. 
Memory Judgements 
Table 2 shows the number of children who endorsed each response category (‘yes’, ‘no’, 
or ‘unsure’) as a function of experimental condition (easy vs. hard). As expected, the results of 
the chi-square analyses indicated that the number of children who reported poor knowledge of 
names was significantly higher in the hard than in the easy condition for the whole sample, 
χ²(2,62) = 25.96, p < .001, as well as for the 4-year-old, χ²(2,18) = 8.05, p = .018, 6-year-old, 
χ²(2,21) = 13.74, p < .001, and 8-year-old groups, χ²(2,23) = 7.97, p = .019. In other words, 
despite recalling more exemplars, children in the hard condition rated their access to names as 
worse than children in the easy condition. These findings seem to indicate that children—
whatever their age—rely on the experienced ease of recall to guide their memory decisions. 
Interestingly, post hoc analyses revealed that only 8-year-old children made significant use of 
the ‘unsure’ option, χ² = 3.56, p < .05. This pattern suggests that older children might be 
starting to exert some kind of control over their memory judgements and thus are less apt to 
rely on the availability heuristic in irrelevant contexts. 
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< Table 2 > 
Discussion 
The primary focus of this research was to determine whether young children’s 
assessments of their memory are influenced by the subjective ease experienced during the 
retrieval process. Our results provide evidence supporting this hypothesis. In this study, even 4-
year-old children are shown to judge their memory as better after generating a small number of 
names than after generating a large number of names, suggesting that participants rely more 
on the subjective feeling of ease than on the absolute number of generated items to make their 
memory decisions. 
From a theoretical point of view, these findings are consistent with the results of other 
studies which have recently established that the implementation of inference rules, based on 
subjective experience or metacognitive expectations, to regulate decision-making processes 
develops very early in childhood (Geurten, Willems, & Meulemans, 2015a; Geurten et al., 
2015b; Hembacher & Ghetti, 2014). Moreover, the results obtained for the 8-year-old group 
suggest that, at some point in their development, children stop blindly relying on the subjective 
feeling of ease when making decisions. Specifically, we hypothesize that children have 
metacognitive beliefs about when ease of processing should be used to guide memory 
decisions. Based on these beliefs, we suspect that older children (who have more cognitive 
resources) start to strategically disqualify the feeling of ease as a cue for judgements when it is 
experienced in irrelevant contexts (Westerman et al., 2003). Interestingly, the latter hypothesis 
is supported by the results of Pachur, Mata, and Schooler (2009) indicating that adults with 
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good cognitive capacities are able to strategically disqualify subjective cues for judgments when 
those cues are perceived as irrelevant. 
In conclusion, consistent with the “experienced ease” interpretation of the availability 
heuristic, this study indicates that, in some circumstances, young children may base their 
memory decisions on the subjective ease of retrieval rather than the objective number of items 
they are able to recall. These findings will, of course, need to be generalized to other sorts of 
memory procedures. Nevertheless, given the alleged involvement of the availability heuristic in 
a wide range of decision-making processes, the developmental trend—and especially, the 
transition from automatic to controlled use—in this inference rule should be carefully 
examined in future research on children’s decision making. 
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Table 1 
Participants’ Characteristics (Means and Standard Deviations) by Age Group 
 4 years 6 years 8 years 
No. of females 11/23 12/24 18/24 
Age (months) 56.62 (1.91) 77.04 (3.66) 99.27 (9.67) 
Parental education level 13.78 (1.97) 13.65 (2.30) 13.42 (2.79) 
Nonverbal intelligence 9.22 (2.07) 9.88 (2.56) 10.71 (3.06) 
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Table 2 




Yes No Unsure 
Total (n = 62) Easy 26 4 1 
Hard 6 22 3 
8 years (n = 23) Easy 9 2 0 
Hard 3 6 3 
6 years (n = 21) Easy 9 1 0 
Hard  1 10 0 
4 years (n = 18) Easy 8 1 1 
Hard 2 6 0 
Note. Critical cells for comparison are underlined. 
